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Abstract
When faced with delayed, uncertain rewards, humans and
other animals usually prefer to know the eventual outcomes
in advance. This preference for cues providing advance infor-
mation can lead to seemingly suboptimal choices, where less
reward is preferred over more reward. Here, we introduce a
reinforcement-learning model of this behavior, the anticipated
prediction error (APE) model, based on the idea that predic-
tion errors themselves can be rewarding. As a result, animals
will sometimes pick options that yield large prediction errors,
even when the expected rewards are smaller. We compare the
APE model against an alternative information-bonus model,
where information itself is viewed as rewarding. These mod-
els are evaluated against a newly collected dataset with human
participants. The APE model fits the data as well or better
than the other models, with fewer free parameters, thus provid-
ing a more robust and parsimonious account of the suboptimal
choices. These results suggest that anticipated prediction er-
rors can be an important signal underpinning decision making.
Keywords: information seeking; early resolution of uncer-
tainty; anticipated prediction errors; forward sampling.
Introduction
Humans and other animals have a strong preference for infor-
mative options. They are inherently curious and will explore
unknown options, even sacrificing rewards to resolve an un-
certain outcome early. Sometimes the search for predictive
information can be independent of profit and have no effect
on the delivery of primary rewards, as if consuming infor-
mation itself was rewarding (Wyckoff, 1952; Prokasy, 1956;
Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009; Iigaya, Story, Kurth-
Nelson, Dolan, & Dayan, 2016). On occasion, this infor-
mation seeking can lead to seemingly suboptimal behaviors
with animals preferring options with lower expected values
(Spetch, Belke, Barnet, Dunn, & Pierce, 1990; Roper & Zen-
tall, 1999). In this paper, we develop a new computational
model of this information-seeking behaviour based on the
idea that animals’ choices reflect both the expected rewards
and the anticipated prediction errors from any upcoming cues.
This preference for advanced information has been widely
observed across species, including rats (Prokasy, 1956;
Chow, Smith, Wilson, Zentall, & Beckmann, 2016), pigeons
(Spetch et al., 1990), starlings (Vasconcelos, Monteiro, &
Kacelnik, 2015), monkeys (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka,
2009, 2011; Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015),
and humans (Iigaya et al., 2016). In some cases, animals
even give up food or water for advance information about
impending rewards, even though these advanced signals do
not change the eventual reward. For example, pigeons re-
liably choose an alternative that provides delayed access to
food 50% of the time over one that always provides the same
amount of food with the same delay, but only when an imme-
diate cue is provided, which signals to the pigeons whether or
not food will eventually be available on that trial (Spetch et
al., 1990; Gipson, Alessandri, Miller, & Zentall, 2009). The
choice of the 50% option is clearly suboptimal in terms of
reward-intake maximization. Similarly, when choosing be-
tween delayed, probabilistic rewards, monkeys and humans
will prefer an option that informs them about the eventual
outcome of that trial over one that leaves the resolution of un-
certainty to the time of reward delivery (Bromberg-Martin &
Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Iigaya et al., 2016).
In addition to the presence of advance information, a few
variables have proven critical to the emergence of this subop-
timal choice (see McDevitt, Dunn, Spetch, and Ludvig (2016)
for review). First, the contingencies between the predictive
cues and the outcomes is important because it influences the
amount of uncertainty resolved by the cues: The more infor-
mation conveyed by the predictive cues, the more preferred
the associated choice target (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka,
2009). Second, humans and other animals also exhibit a pref-
erence for earlier advanced notice of the eventual outcome.
Increased information seeking has been found in the case of
longer delays (Spetch et al., 1990; Iigaya et al., 2016). Third,
the subjective value of advance information scales with the
reward magnitude of the potential outcomes (Blanchard et
al., 2015). Finally, aversive outcomes can sometimes pro-
duce outright information avoidance in human subjects, as in
the Ostrich effect (Karlsson, Loewenstein, & Seppi, 2009).
Given this rich set of empirical findings, we endeavored to
build a computational model that can capture as many of these
empirical results as possible, but first we briefly review the
existing computational models for this information-seeking
behaviour.
Existing Computational Models
The apparent departures from optimality observed when ad-
vance information is available poses a significant computa-
tional challenge to standard models of reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) (Niv & Chan, 2011). Previous research has ex-
plored several possible extensions and refinements to the
usual RL framework, including the information bonus model
(Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2011), the disengagement
model (Beierholm & Dayan, 2010), and the anticipatory util-
ity model (Iigaya et al., 2016). The information bonus model
encapsulates the idea that receiving advance information acts
as if it were a primary reward. This information bonus has
alternatively been operationalized as either a free parameter
(Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2011) or as the Shannon en-
tropy of the reward probability (Bennett, Bode, Brydevall,
Warren, & Murawski, 2016). These ideas successfully ex-
plain the observed preference for more informative options
(Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009). Formalizing the in-
formation bonus as the Shannon entropy, however, fails to
deal with, for instance, the fact that animals prefer to observe
more even when the number of bits they receive by doing so
is less (Roper & Zentall, 1999). On the other hand, without
using Shannon entropy, the information bonus cannot capture
the relationship between information seeking and probabil-
ity, which resembles an inverse U-shaped function (Green &
Rachlin, 1977).
The anticipatory utility model is a recently proposed alter-
native model for these data, which formalizes the economic
idea of savouring (Loewenstein, 1987; Iigaya et al., 2016).
According to this model, animals are hypothesized to enjoy or
savour the anticipation of guaranteed rewards to come. Antic-
ipatory utility alone, however, cannot explain why the delay
to reward would influence how much the informative option
is preferred (Spetch et al., 1990; Iigaya et al., 2016). This lim-
itation emerges because delay renders anticipatory utility less
rewarding at the same speed as the primary reward. To rec-
tify this, an additional boosting mechanism was introduced
to enhance anticipatory utility, and thereby slow down effect
of discounting future rewards (Iigaya et al., 2016). The full
model, including this boosting mechanism, explains a wide
range of information-seeking behaviours, including many of
the properties of sub-optimal choice. One challenge for the
anticipatory utility model is how such a mechanism could be
learned locally, as the computations require full knowledge of
the eventual time to reward in advance (Niv & Chan, 2011).
The Anticipated Prediction Error Model
Given these limitations on prior models, here, we develop an
alternative formalism centered around the idea of anticipated
prediction errors (APE). According to the APE model, ani-
mals draw one-step samples of their anticipated futures from
a simple model of the world and calculate the prediction error
that would be associated with that sample. These anticipated
prediction errors are then treated as though they were reward-
ing in and of themselves, reminiscent of how momentary sub-
jective well-being correlates with prediction errors (Rutledge,
Skandali, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014). These samples are biased
such that futures which contain positive prediction errors are
more likely to be sampled. This forward sampling (i.e. an-
ticipation) from the current state using imagined experiences
and learned environmental dynamics, such as developed in
the Dyna-2 architecture (Silver, Sutton, & Mu¨ller, 2008), can
provide useful anticipatory signals that guide decision mak-
ing. The critical difference between the APE model and the
standard RL model is that the APE model maintains two sepa-
rate valuation systems: one estimated from actual experience
(model-free), and the other estimated through this forward-
sampling process (model-based). The prediction errors gen-
erated via the forward traces are called anticipated prediction
errors (APEs). Together with the conventional value func-
tions, these APEs drive the preference to seek or avoid certain
future states. The bias in the sampling process toward posi-
tive prediction errors can even induce suboptimal choices.
Model Specification
We extend the standard Temporal-difference (TD) model
(Sutton & Barto, 1998) where agents are assumed to estimate
an action-value function for each experimental stimulus:
Q(st ,at) = E[
∞
∑
k=1
γkrt+k−1] (1)
where t indexes time, st specifies the state visited at time t,
rt indicates the immediate reward delivered at time t, and γ ∈
[0,1) is a discount factor, which devalues delayed rewards.
This action-value function represents the expected discounted
future reward. In TD learning, this action-value function is
estimated through a simple incremental update mechanism:
Q(st ,at)← Q(st ,at)+αδt+1 (2)
where α is the learning rate and δ is the reward prediction
error (RPE), calculated as follows:
δt+1 = rt+1+ γmax
a
Q(st+1,a)−Q(st ,at) (3)
This RPE signal represents the difference between the value
of the current state-action pair and the value of the best next-
state-action plus the reward achieved in the transition. Thus,
RPEs are triggered by each state transition; the mechanics of
the APE model hinge on the transition from choice to the pre-
dictive cues which reveals what the eventual outcomes will be
on that trial. In particular, a good cue, which resolves reward
uncertainty appealingly, will generate positive RPEs, whereas
a bad cue will generate negative RPEs. The RPEs will be zero
in response to non-predictive cues, once the values are well
learned.
Here, we define anticipated prediction errors (APE) as the
perceived discrepancy between the current state (what it is
like at present) and an anticipated future state (how it would
be in the future) (see Figure 1). Formally, if there is no im-
mediate primary reward delivered during the trajectory from
state s to s′ (e.g., the transition from choice state to cue states
in the information choice task), then the value of APE in state
s when anticipating future state s′ is defined as the product
of prediction errors between the two states and the transition
probability:
APE(s′|s,a) = T (s′|s,a)× [γDss′ max
a′
Q(s′,a′)−Q(s,a)] (4)
where Dss′ is the time taken to travel from s to s′, and
T (s′|s,a) is the transition probability from s to s′ by taking
action a. In the simulations here, this travel time is always
taken to be 1, but the formulation is more general.
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Figure 1: Formal representation of the information-choice
task as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Two offers (red
and blue circles) are presented and the animal must choose
one of them. A cue then appears after this initial choice,
which is either informative (green S+ indicates a rewarding
outcome, and yellow S0 indicates a neutral outcome) or unin-
formative (black S∗ leaving the animal in a state of uncer-
tainty). Following a delay (Tdelay), the animal obtains the
outcome (reward or no reward). The anticipatory signals pro-
posed by the APE model are illustrated as purple dashed lines.
Note that this computation relies on the samples generated
based on the learned environment dynamics. The primary
assumption of the APE model is that humans and other an-
imals treat APEs as though they were rewarding, whereby
positive APEs are reinforcing and negative APEs punishing.
The APEs are positive when the anticipated value of the fu-
ture sampled state is better than value of the present state and
negative in the opposite case. These quantities can also be un-
derstood as measurements of the pleasure (displeasure) one
derives from anticipating the good cue (bad cue). Further-
more, attention weights are assigned to each individual APE,
specifying the relative likelihood that a particular future state
will be sampled. Accordingly, the decision value Q¯ of taking
action a is defined as the weighted sum of APEs for antici-
pated future outcomes plus the value function for the corre-
sponding state:
Q¯(s,a) = ∑
sk∈S
wkAPE(sk|s,a)+Q(s,a) (5)
where S denotes the set of all possible future states after tak-
ing action a at the state s that a subject can attend to.
Given the decision values of both the cued and the un-
cued options, the softmax function is then used to compute
the probability of choosing the cued option:
P(a) =
eβQ¯(s,a)
∑a′∈A eβQ¯(s,a
′) (6)
where A is the set of all possible actions at state s, and β is
an inverse temperature parameter, which controls the degree
of exploration.
Experiment
We conducted an empirical experiment to evaluate the qual-
ity of the APE model in comparison with the information-
bonus model discussed above. In the experiment, people
were repeatedly given a choice between an informative or
non-informative option, where the outcomes were delayed
20s. Outcomes were either positive (erotic images), neutral
(images of objects) or negative (aversive images). Good tri-
als involved positive or neutral images, Mixed trials involved
positive or negative images, and bad trials involved negative
or neutral images. These outcomes were always delivered
with 50/50 odds on each trial. Qualitatively, the APE model
predicts that people will seek information in the positive and
mixed cases, but not the negative cases. This prediction
emerges from bias toward sampling future states with posi-
tive outcomes. The information bonus model would expect
equivalent information seeking in all cases, as the amount of
information present is equal in all three types of choices.
Methods
Participants Eighty human participants were recruited from
the Warwick University SONA system. All participants gave
informed consent and were paid a flat rate of 5 pounds for
their participation.
Task Participants performed the experiment on Windows
PCs running PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). The task was a simple
two-alternative forced choice between an uncued target (Keep
It Secret), which was followed by a non-predictive cue, and
a cued target (Find Out Now), which was immediately fol-
lowed by predictive cues that signalled the eventual outcome.
Choosing either the cued or the uncued option did not alter the
odds nor the eventual outcomes. The only difference between
the two options was the presence or absence of advance infor-
mation about those eventual outcomes. After choice, the cue
was present for 20 seconds in all trials. The outcome image
was presented immediately at the end of this cue. To ensure
participants viewed the image, they had to press a randomly
selected key (indicated on the image proper) to advance to the
next trial.
The experiment consisted of three different conditions in
terms of the valence of eventual outcomes. In the Good con-
dition, the gamble included 50% erotic images and 50% neu-
tral images (as illustrated in Figure 2). In the Bad condition,
the gamble included 50% aversive images and 50% neutral
images. In the Mixed condition, the gamble included 50%
erotic images and 50% aversive images. The images used
in the experiment were previously validated in the Interna-
tional Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, Cuthbert, et
al., 1999). Sixteen images from the “EroticCouple” category
were selected as positive images for heterosexual subjects and
another 16 images from “Mutilation” category were selected
as the aversive images. Images were chosen as the rewards
so that they could be consumed immediately, as opposed to
monetary rewards (Crockett et al., 2013). All participants
completed 16 interleaved trials for each condition, making
48 trials in total. Participants were informed about the nature
of the potential outcomes before the experiment started.
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Figure 2: Human information choice task. The diagram illus-
trates the Good condition, which contains a gamble of 50%
erotic and 50% neutral images. The experiment also tested a
Bad condition (50% aversive and 50% neutral images) and a
Mixed condition (50% erotic and 50% aversive images).
Results
A total of 69 heterosexual participants (48 female and 21
male) completed the task. Eleven participants were excluded
(6 non-heterosexual, 4 did not disclose their sexual orienta-
tion, and 1 did not complete the task). Only the data from the
last nine trials per condition are reported here.
As shown in Figure 3, participants chose the cued op-
tion on average 42.8%±8.2%, 60.2%±7.6%, and 71.8%±
6.5% in the Bad, Mixed, and Good conditions respectively.
Choices in the Good condition and the Mixed condition
were significantly higher than chance responding (Good:
t(68) = 6.72, p< 0.001,d = 1.143; Mixed: t(68) = 2.68, p=
0.009,d = 0.456). In the Bad condition, people chose the
informative slightly below chance, but not significantly so
(t(68) = −1.75, p = 0.085,d = −0.297). There were, how-
ever, considerable individual differences in the preferences
for advance information (dashed grey lines in Figure 3). This
pattern of responses qualitatively agree with the predictions
of the APE model, but not the information-bonus model.
Model Comparisons
Next, we attempted a quantitative model comparison, fitting
both the APE model and the information-bonus model to the
individual choice proportions in the current dataset.
To fit the APE model to the data, first note that the ex-
pected rewards for both options are held constant in the ex-
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Figure 3: Mean percentage of choosing cued option (Find
Out Now) in the Bad, Mixed, and Good conditions. Error
bars indicate± SEM in mean choice proportions. The dashed
black line indicates the 50% choice probability. The dashed
grey lines are individual choice probabilities.
perimental task, Q(cued) = Q(uncued). In addition, receiv-
ing non-predictive cues leaves participants equally uncertain
about the eventual outcomes, and thus sampling from those
states does not generate any anticipated prediction errors,
APE(S∗|uncued) = 0. This analysis suggests that only the
APEs related to the predictive cues determine choices in the
current task. Following this logic, from equation (5), we can
calculate differences in the action values of the cued and un-
cued options in the Good, Bad, and Mixed conditions, respec-
tively as follows:
∆Q¯Good = w+APE(S+|cued)+w0APE(S0|cued) (7)
= (w+−w0)γ
T R
4
(8)
∆Q¯Bad = w−APE(S−|cued)+w0APE(S0|cued) (9)
= (w0−w−)γ
T R
4
(10)
∆Q¯Mixed = w+APE(S+|cued)+w−APE(S−|cued) (11)
= (w+−w−)γ
T R
2
(12)
where T is the length of the delay, R is the absolute magni-
tude of rewards or punishment, and S+,S−,S0 are the cues in-
dicating positive, negative, or neutral outcomes. The weight
factors are associated with their corresponding future states.
Note that only the differences in weights matter for model
behavior.
Any individual differences are reflected by the weight pa-
rameters in the APE model. The APE model predicts no
preference for advance information when w+ = w− = w0.
We hypothesize that the differences in weights for various
future outcomes give rise to information seeking or avoid-
ance behaviors. The preferences for advance information
would arise, for instance, in the Mixed condition if the model
weights S+ more heavily than S−: w+ > w−.
As described above, the information-bonus model
(Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2011) assumes that infor-
mation has an intrinsic value, rinfo, which in our setting was
delivered upon each state transition to an informative cue
state. This model would predict the differences in decision
values as follows:
∆Q¯ = rinfo (13)
for all situations where information is sometimes available.
We also considered a potential extension to the information-
bonus model which would assign different values to differ-
ent types of information: r+info,r
−
info,r
0
info for viewing reward
predicting cues, punishment predicting cues, and neutrality
predicting cues respectively.
Model Fitting
The models were fit to the the data using hierarchical
Bayesian modeling (Huys et al., 2011), in which the maxi-
mum a posteriori estimate of each parameter hi for each par-
ticipant i is calculated. These parameters are treated as a
random sample from a Gaussian population distribution with
means and variance θ = {µθ,Σθ}. Model comparison was
based on the integrated Bayesian Information Criteria (iBIC)
scores with an uninformative prior. As such, we analyzed the
log likelihood p(D|M) of each model directly:
p(D|M) =
∫
p(D|θ)p(θ|M)dθ (14)
≈−1
2
iBIC (15)
= log p(D|θML)− 1
2
|M| log |D| (16)
where |D| is the number of choices made by all participants,
and |M| is the number of parameters fitted. We compute the
log p(D|θML) as the sum of integrals over individual parame-
ters:
p(D|θML) =∑
i
log
∫
p(Di|h)p(h|θML)dh (17)
≈∑
i
log
1
K
K
∑
k=1
p(Di|hk) (18)
where the integrals are replaced by a sum over samples
from the empirical prior. This step ensures that we evalu-
ate how well the model fits the data only using information
about the group parameters.
As a result, the iBIC penalizes for model complexity, and
the model with the lowest iBIC is taken as the best-fitting
model. As shown in Table 1, the best-fitting APE model
vastly outperformed the different information-bonus models.
We use the iBIC score of the best fitted model as a baseline
and derive the differences in iBIC as ∆iBIC.
Table 1: Quality of model fit to behavioral data
Model Free parameters Model iBIC ∆iBIC
APE w+−w−,w−−w0 2065.1 40.4
APE w+−w−,w−−w0,γ 2126.3 101.6
APE w+−w−,w−−w0,β 2024.7 0.0
APE w+−w−,w−−w0,β,γ 2137.2 112.5
Info Bonus rinfo 2361.5 336.8
Info Bonus rinfo,β 2430.8 406.1
Info Bonus r+info,r
−
info,r
0
info 2098.8 74.1
Info Bonus r+info,r
−
info,r
0
info,β 2081.0 56.3
Discussion
We have introduced a novel model of information-seeking in
choice, which assumes that preferences are driven by antic-
ipated prediction errors (APEs) accumulated through simu-
lated forward trajectories. These APEs are treated like re-
wards, which combined with a bias toward sampling trajec-
tories with positive outcomes, leads to information seeking
in situations with potential positive outcomes. The model
was compared against an information-bonus model through
a novel empirical experiment, whereby people were given the
opportunity to get early information about rewarding or aver-
sive outcomes. As the APE model predicted, and contrary to
the information-bonus model, people only sought early infor-
mation for positive outcomes. Quantitative model selection
supported these conclusions.
In addition to better fitting the novel dataset, the
APE model provides potential insights into other types of
information-induced sub-optimal choices (McDevitt et al.,
2016). For example, the positive APE scales with the prob-
ability of reward (larger with lower probabilities), provid-
ing a mechanism through which a lower probability reward
could be preferred to a higher probability one, as some-
times observed in animals (Spetch et al., 1990; Roper &
Zentall, 1999; Gipson et al., 2009). In addition, unlike an
information bonus, the APE is sensitive to the magnitude
of reward and would grow with larger rewards leading to
greater preference for informative options, as observed with
information-seeking in monkeys (Blanchard et al., 2015). Fu-
ture work will require direct simulation of these other find-
ings, as well as further comparison to existing models, in-
cluding the different information-bonus models (Bromberg-
Martin & Hikosaka, 2011; Bennett et al., 2016) and the antic-
ipatory utility model (Iigaya et al., 2016).
The current experimental protocol only involved a shal-
low decision tree, and the corresponding APE model pre-
sented here only used one-step anticipation. For decision
trees with high branching factors and/or larger depths, how-
ever, it would be computationally intractable to sample from
all possible forward trajectories. For example, one recent
study used a four-stage information-seeking game, and ob-
served systematic deviations from the optimal strategy (Hunt,
Rutledge, Malalasekera, Kennerley, & Dolan, 2016). This
type of task poses yet another computational challenge for
all the models discussed here. The APE model, which al-
ready involves look-ahead experiences, is readily adaptable
to incorporate other, more sophisticated, planning algorithms
such as Monte-Carlo tree search (Coulom, 2006). This po-
tential extension of the model to more complex tree search
remains a question for further research.
References
Beierholm, U. R., & Dayan, P. (2010). Pavlovian-
instrumental interaction in observing behavior. PLoS Com-
put Biol, 6(9), e1000903.
Bennett, D., Bode, S., Brydevall, M., Warren, H., & Mu-
rawski, C. (2016). Intrinsic valuation of information in de-
cision making under uncertainty. PLoS Comput Biol, 12(7),
e1005020.
Blanchard, T. C., Hayden, B. Y., & Bromberg-Martin, E. S.
(2015). Orbitofrontal cortex uses distinct codes for dif-
ferent choice attributes in decisions motivated by curiosity.
Neuron, 85(3), 602–614.
Bromberg-Martin, E. S., & Hikosaka, O. (2009). Midbrain
dopamine neurons signal preference for advance informa-
tion about upcoming rewards. Neuron, 63(1), 119–126.
Bromberg-Martin, E. S., & Hikosaka, O. (2011). Lateral
habenula neurons signal errors in the prediction of reward
information. Nature neuroscience, 14(9), 1209–1216.
Chow, J. J., Smith, A. P., Wilson, A. G., Zentall, T. R., &
Beckmann, J. S. (2016). Suboptimal choice in rats: in-
centive salience attribution promotes maladaptive decision-
making. Behavioural Brain Research.
Coulom, R. (2006). Efficient selectivity and backup operators
in monte-carlo tree search. In International conference on
computers and games (pp. 72–83).
Crockett, M. J., Braams, B. R., Clark, L., Tobler, P. N., Rob-
bins, T. W., & Kalenscher, T. (2013). Restricting temp-
tations: neural mechanisms of precommitment. Neuron,
79(2), 391–401.
Gipson, C. D., Alessandri, J. J., Miller, H. C., & Zentall, T. R.
(2009). Preference for 50% reinforcement over 75% rein-
forcement by pigeons. Learning & Behavior, 37(4), 289–
298.
Green, L., & Rachlin, H. (1977). Pigeons’preferences for
stimulus information: Effects of amount of information1.
Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 27(2),
255–263.
Hunt, L. T., Rutledge, R. B., Malalasekera, N., Kennerley,
S. W., & Dolan, R. J. (2016). Approach-induced biases in
human information sampling. bioRxiv, 047787.
Huys, Q. J., Cools, R., Go¨lzer, M., Friedel, E., Heinz, A.,
Dolan, R. J., & Dayan, P. (2011). Disentangling the roles of
approach, activation and valence in instrumental and pavlo-
vian responding. PLoS Comput Biol, 7(4), e1002028.
Iigaya, K., Story, G. W., Kurth-Nelson, Z., Dolan, R. J., &
Dayan, P. (2016). The modulation of savouring by predic-
tion error and its effects on choice. eLife, 5, e13747.
Karlsson, N., Loewenstein, G., & Seppi, D. (2009). The
ostrich effect: Selective attention to information. Journal
of Risk and uncertainty, 38(2), 95–115.
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., Cuthbert, B. N., et al. (1999). In-
ternational affective picture system (iaps): Instruction man-
ual and affective ratings. The center for research in psy-
chophysiology, University of Florida.
Loewenstein, G. (1987). Anticipation and the valuation of de-
layed consumption. The Economic Journal, 97(387), 666–
684.
McDevitt, M. A., Dunn, R. M., Spetch, M. L., & Ludvig,
E. A. (2016). When good news leads to bad choices. Jour-
nal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 105(1), 23–
40.
Niv, Y., & Chan, S. (2011). On the value of information and
other rewards. Nature neuroscience, 14(9), 1095.
Peirce, J. W. (2007). Psychopypsychophysics software in
python. Journal of neuroscience methods, 162(1), 8–13.
Prokasy, W. F. (1956). The acquisition of observing re-
sponses in the absence of differential external reinforce-
ment. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychol-
ogy, 49(2), 131.
Roper, K. L., & Zentall, T. R. (1999). Observing behavior
in pigeons: The effect of reinforcement probability and re-
sponse cost using a symmetrical choice procedure. Learn-
ing and Motivation, 30(3), 201–220.
Rutledge, R. B., Skandali, N., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J.
(2014). A computational and neural model of momen-
tary subjective well-being. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 111(33), 12252–12257.
Silver, D., Sutton, R. S., & Mu¨ller, M. (2008). Sample-based
learning and search with permanent and transient memo-
ries. In Proceedings of the 25th international conference
on machine learning (pp. 968–975).
Spetch, M. L., Belke, T. W., Barnet, R. C., Dunn, R., &
Pierce, W. D. (1990). Suboptimal choice in a percentage-
reinforcement procedure: Effects of signal condition and
terminal-link length. Journal of the experimental analysis
of behavior, 53(2), 219–234.
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement learning:
An introduction (Vol. 1) (No. 1). MIT press Cambridge.
Vasconcelos, M., Monteiro, T., & Kacelnik, A. (2015). Ir-
rational choice and the value of information. Scientific re-
ports, 5.
Wyckoff, L. B. (1952). The role of observing responses in
discrimination learning. part i. Psychological review, 59(6),
431.
